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Introduction 
It is generally accepted that employee share schemes (ESS) confer a number of 
benefits not only on participating employees but also on their employers. Those 
benefits come from aligning employer and employee interests, encouraging positive 
working relationships, boosting productivity through greater employee involvement in 
the success or otherwise of the business, reducing staff turnover and encouraging 
good corporate governance. As an additional benefit employee share schemes can 
also help cash-strapped start-up, R&D and speculative companies to offer key 
employees equity in lieu of the higher salaries that the companies’ cash position 
might not permit.  
Given the very obvious benefits that such schemes offer, it is unfortunate, but 
perhaps not surprising, that the taxation treatment to which they have been subject 
has not been consistent. 
The rules were relatively stable from 1995 to 2009 when Division 13A of Part III 
ITAA36 (and, before it, ITAA 1936 s 26AAC) included the discount to market value at 
which employees acquired their shares (or rights to acquire shares) in their 
assessable income – subject, in the case of Div 13A, to two concessions, a ‘deferral 
concession’ which allowed employees to defer inclusion of the discount in their 
taxable income for up to 10 years and an ‘exemption concession’, which allowed 
them to exempt the first $1,000 of the discount each year provided certain conditions 
were satisfied. The two were mutually exclusive and the second could only apply if 
the employee elected it.  
However, unless one of those concessions applied the default position though was 
that the value of the discount was included in the employee’s assessable income 
when they received the share or right1 (ie up front). This also had certain advantages 
in that the value of the discount could then be relatively small - so the tax payable 
could also be relatively insignificant and might be eclipsed by the benefit that the 
employee gained when he or she subsequently sold the shares and was taxed on 
the proceeds not as income but as a capital gain under the more advantageous CGT 
rules. 
1 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 s 139B 
                                                          
Because of concerns that these provisions were being abused, especially in relation 
to executive remuneration, the then Treasurer announced in the 2009 budget that 
the taxation treatment of Employee Share Schemes would be amended with effect 1 
July 2009 ‘to improve the horizontal equity in the tax system by treating all forms of 
remuneration more consistently, to target ESS tax concessions more closely to low 
and middle income earners, and to reduce the scope for losses to the 
Commonwealth revenue through tax evasion and avoidance’.2   
 
The new rules (in Division 83A of the ITAA97) largely replicated Div 13A’s provisions 
but they also introduced some significant changes (and were, incidentally, expected 
to generate $135 million in additional revenue over the forward estimates). They 
were criticised for the complexity they introduced and, at a practical level, they also 
impacted negatively to the subsequent take-up of, and participation in, employee 
share schemes in Australia. 
 
As a consequence, in December 2013 the newly elected coalition government 
announced that, in response to industry concerns, it would reconsider the taxation 
and regulation of ESS as part of its focus on measures to encourage innovation. It 
later undertook to reform them as part of its 2014 Industry Innovation and 
Competitiveness Agenda. 
 
The reforms, which came into effect on 1 July 2015, reversed some of the 2009 
changes, introduced a further tax concession for employees of some start-up 
companies and provided measures to streamline the process for establishing and 
maintaining an ESS. 
 
This paper examines those changes, evaluates the extent to which they have 
effectively addressed the problems with the 2009 provisions and considers what 
additional reforms may be desirable.  
 
How Employee Share Schemes Work 
Employee Share Schemes can work in a number of ways.  
First, there can be an immediate right for employees to participate by purchasing 
shares, usually through some mechanism designed to provide them with an effective 
discount to market price and, often, involving a salary sacrifice arrangement to 
enhance the number of shares they can acquire.  Such schemes usually involve the 
issue of shares to, or purchase of shares by, an Employee Share Trust which may or 
may not then hold them on the employees’ behalf until some later vesting date. 
2 Explanatory Memorandum to the Tax Laws Amendment (2009 Budget Measures No 2) Bill 2009 at 
para. 1.15 
                                                          
Alternatively, employees may receive an option to acquire shares in their company at 
a fixed or determinable price at some time in the future with either the right to the 
options themselves or the right to exercise those options often being dependant on 
the employee meeting specified hurdles. This is particularly so with executive share 
plans where the exercise right may be dependent on the achievement of nominated 
corporate objectives such as profit or share price targets or a range of other readily 
quantifiable measures of corporate performance.  
The option alternative is also widely used in small to medium, particularly start-up, 
companies to compensate key employees for the lower salaries and greater 
uncertainty regarding continuity of employment that working for such companies 
usually entails. In either case such schemes are technically not employee share 
schemes but employee share option plans.  
The Regulation of Employee Share Schemes 
Employee share schemes are regulated by two sets of laws – the companies 
legislation (dealing with the way in which such share schemes must be administered 
including facilitating them by waiving requirements such as the prospectus 
requirements that generally apply to share issues3) and taxation legislation (mainly 
the Income Tax Assessment Acts but also, potentially, the Fringe Benefits 
Assessment Act).  
The Taxation of Employee Share Schemes Before 2009 
While the receipt of any benefit as a consequence of employment can be seen as 
income from personal exertion and, therefore, taxable as ordinary income (or, 
alternatively, as a taxable fringe benefit), any discount to market value that an 
employee received on the acquisition of shares or rights to acquire shares has 
always been treated (and taxed) under specific (and separate) rules.  
Before 1974 the value to the taxpayer of the discount was taxed simply as a ‘benefit’ 
under ITAA1936 s 26(e) (now ITAA97 s 15-2). The difficulty with this was that s 26(e) 
brought the ‘value’ of that benefit into assessable income even if it was conditional or 
did not really arise until some point in the future. This was made clear in Donaldson v 
FCT [1974] 1 NSWLR 627; (1974) 23 FLR 1 where the Commissioner’s contention 
that the taxpayer had ‘derived income’ when he was granted options to acquire 
shares in his employer, Hooker Corporation Ltd, under an employee incentive 
scheme, was upheld even though the options could not be exercised until specified 
3 The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides a wide range of relief for Employee Share Schemes from 
the requirements that normally apply to an issue of securities. These include relief from the normal 
prospectus or other disclosure document requirements (disclosure relief), the requirement for those 
involved to obtain an Australian financial services (AFS) licence (licensing relief), from the prohibition 
on advertising or publicity before an offer or intended offer is made (advertising relief) and from the 
prohibition on the issue or sale of financial products arising out of unsolicited contact with employees 
(hawking relief). 
                                                          
times in the future and were conditional on the taxpayer remaining in the company’s 
employ in the intervening period (a standard ‘golden handcuffs’ requirement).  
The Court held that the options, being in the nature of a bonus or addition to salary, 
were of an income character and, therefore, that their ‘value to the taxpayer’ was 
immediately assessable under s 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
(Cth).4 It also found that that ‘value’ could be ascertained by determining ‘what a 
prudent person in [the taxpayer’s] position would have been willing to give for the 
rights rather than fail to obtain them’5 and, because the taxpayer bore the onus of 
showing that the Commissioner’s assessment of that value was excessive but had 
not demonstrated either that it was wrong or that some other figure should be 
substituted for it, the Commissioner’s assessment was upheld. 
The government responded by inserting a new s 26AAC into the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) to provide a specific provision under which employee 
share scheme discounts connected with services rendered by an employee (or by 
non-employees but in a similar capacity) could be taxed.  
Section 26AAC provided that the appropriate taxing point for options6 was when the 
options were exercised and converted to shares, not when they were received. Its 
effect was therefore to include the value (as at the date of acquisition) of shares that 
were acquired under an ESS as the result of exercising an option, less the costs of 
acquisition, in the recipient’s assessable income in the year in which the shares were 
actually acquired. Consequently, unless a right to acquire a share was either 
exercised or sold the employee did not become liable to tax.  
For schemes involving a direct issues of shares at a discount (ie not pursuant to the 
exercise of a previously acquired option) the taxing point remained the year in which 
they were acquired – though, from 1988, if they were issued to employees or 
directors and were subject to conditions or restrictions which limited the recipient’s 
right to dispose of them, or were liable to be divested, they were deemed to be 
acquired if and when those conditions or restrictions ceased to apply. 
When capital gains tax was introduced in 1985 two additional alternative 
concessions (which were only available to employees or directors – not associates) 
were introduced – a tax deferral option which allowed the holder of shares that were 
acquired after 19 September 1985 to elect to be assessed in the year the shares 
4 The finding that they were of an income character was necessary because it had earlier been held 
that s 26(e) only applied to items of an income nature (see Fullagar J in Hayes v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 96 CLR 47 at 54 and Windeyer J in Scott v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1966) 117 CLR 514 at 525-6). 
5 Donaldson v FCT [1974] 1 NSWLR 627 at 644; (1974) 23 FLR 1 at 21 (citing Pastoral Finance 
Association Ltd v The Minister (1914) 15 SR (NSW) 535 at 540; [1914] AC 1083 at 1088). 
6 For shares the taxing point remained the year in which they were acquired under the scheme – 
though shares which were issued subject to conditions or restrictions which limited the employee’s 
right to dispose of them, or which were liable to be divested, were deemed to be acquired if and when 
those conditions or restrictions ceased to apply. 
                                                          
were actually acquired instead of in the year they were deemed to be acquired 
(when any conditions or restrictions on their disposal ceased to apply), and a tax 
exemption option which allowed the first $200 of any discount to be excluded from 
the employee’s assessable income each year.7    
Section 26AAC continued to apply until Div 13A, another regime specifically 
designed to tax the discount at which shares or other interests were issued under an 
ESS, but in a way that prevented the exploitation that had occurred under s 26AAC – 
and which was also better aimed at ensuring that the tax concessions were directed 
at schemes that were broadly available to, and which encouraged, all permanent 
employees to invest in their employer - was enacted to replace it in March 1995.  
From 1995 until 2009, how employees were taxed on the discounts they received on 
shares, stapled securities, or rights (including options) to acquire such shares or 
stapled securities (ESS interests) under the new Division 13A depended on whether 
the scheme in question operated inside (as a ‘qualifying share scheme) or outside 
(as a non-qualifying share scheme) its concessional provisions8  and, if it operated 
inside those provisions, whether the employee elected the tax deferral or the tax 
exemption option.9 The default position, for both shares and rights, was that the 
taxing point was the year of acquisition – thereby maintain the s 26AAC position for 
shares but reinstating the pre-s 26AAC position for rights.  
The incentive to operate outside the Div 13A concessions by including the market 
value10 of the discount in assessable income in the year in which the interests were 
7 This also had the effect of reducing the cost base of the shares by an equivalent amount. This 
concession was also further amended in 1988 so that it only applied where the shares involved were 
ordinary shares, where the scheme required that any interest acquired could not be disposed of within 
3 years of its acquisition unless the employee ceased employment (unless the interest was a right 
and it was disposed of by exercise) and where the scheme was limited to permanent employees only 
but was open to all permanent employees with at least 12 months service and applied equally to all of 
those employees. 
8 Div 13A applied to the acquisition of a share or a right to acquire a share after 6pm in the ACT on 28 
March 1995. For stapled securities the provisions applied to acquisitions on or after 1 July 1996. The 
Division only applied however if the six conditions set out in the then ITAA 1936 s 139CD applied. 
These included a requirement that at the time the employee acquired the share at least 75% of the 
permanent employees of the employer were, or at some earlier time, had been entitled to acquire 
shares or rights under either that scheme or shares or rights in the employer or the employer’s 
holding company under another employee share scheme (though the Commissioner had power to 
overlook non-compliance with this condition if he considered that the employer had done everything 
reasonably practicable to ensure that it had been satisfied – s 139CD(8)). 
9 The premise underlying Div 13A was that the any discount (generally the difference between the 
market price at the time the discount was included in the taxpayer’s assessable income and the 
consideration paid for the interest) that a taxpayer received in relation to the acquisition of a share or 
other ESS interest under an employee share scheme was included in his or her assessable income in 
the year in which the share or other ESS interest was received but, if the interest received was a 
‘qualifying’ interest, the taxpayer was entitled either to defer the inclusion of the discount for up to 10 
years or, at the employee’s election – the concession did not apply to directors - to have the discount 
included in his or her assessable income in the year the interest was acquired but have the first $1000 
of the discount exempted. 
10 The specification of market value was designed to ensure that the amount of the discount could be 
objectively determined. For unlisted companies with illiquid shares this did however create a valuation 
                                                          
acquired - the default position provided under ITAA 1936 s 139B – or to choose the 
tax exemption option under s 139E - was to allow any increase in the value of the 
interests obtained under the scheme to be taxed under the capital gains tax 
provisions instead of under the income tax provisions that automatically applied to 
any increase in the value of the shares or rights being acquired before the ‘cessation 
time’11 if the tax deferral concession applied12 - something which became an even 
more important consideration after the discount capital gains tax provisions were 
introduced in September 1999. 
Of the two permitted concessions tax deferral was the default position in that, for 
qualifying employee share schemes, it applied unless the employee elected the tax 
exemption option instead. It allowed the inclusion of the discount in assessable 
income to be deferred, for up to 10 years, until the year in which the ‘cessation time’ 
occurred.13  
It was most attractive to executives who were able to take significant parts of their 
remuneration in the form of shares, stapled securities or other ESS interests – and 
defer the payment of tax on those equities for as long as possible. This was 
especially so if they were able to acquire such interests through salary sacrifice 
arrangements which allowed them to be acquired with pre-tax as opposed to post-
tax salary (with the result that the employee could generally acquire almost double 
the number of equities - with the resulting benefit of a greater compounding of any 
share price rises that applied thereafter and, of course, additional dividend 
entitlements on the additional shares that could thereby be acquired). If the shares 
were held for more than 30 days after the ‘cessation time’ any increase in their value 
during that part of the holding period was then taxed under the CGT provisions. 
The tax exemption option, on the other hand, was most attractive to general 
employees whose annual participation in such schemes was usually limited to 
relatively small parcels of shares with taxable discounts typically not exceeding 
$1000. If the employee made the required election he or she became liable to pay 
tax on the benefit (the discount at which the shares or other interests were issued) in 
the year in which the benefit was received, but, provided the ‘exemption conditions’ 
problem (with cost and administrative complexity consequences) which has still not been resolved in 
an entirely satisfactory way.  
11 See n 13 below 
12 The effectiveness of such schemes in achieving that outcome in every case was called into 
question in TR 2010/6 which, dealing with loan-based employee benefits trust arrangements, noted 
that the proceeds would normally fall within the income provisions in ITAA 1997 ss 6-5 or 15-2 or, if 
not, could be caught by either Part IVA or the FBT provisions. 
13 The ‘cessation time’ depended on whether what was acquired were shares, rights or stapled 
securities. For shares if there were no restrictions on disposal and the scheme did not have conditions 
that could lead to the share being forfeited the cessation time was the time of acquisition (with the 
result that there was no deferral of the taxing point for the discount). In all other cases the cessation 
time was when the share was ultimately disposed of or the later of the time when any disposal 
restrictions or forfeiture conditions expired, when the employee’s employment ceased or 10 years 
after the share was acquired. Similar provisions applied to rights to acquire shares.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in then s139CE14 were satisfied, the first $1,000 of the discount15 was excluded, 
thereby, in most cases, eliminating any tax liability. When the shares were ultimately 
sold any post-acquisition increase in value was taxed under the CGT provisions and, 
after 21 September 1999, could be subject to the 50% CGT discount.  
 
The 2009 amendments 
The introduction of Div 83A into the ITAA97 in 2009 can only be properly understood 
in the context of the times. It was introduced in a period when there was concern 
about escalating executive remuneration and one of the express reasons given for 
its introduction was to reduce opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance and, 
thereby, to protect Commonwealth revenues in a period of global recession16 
(though it was also expected that it would generate some $135 million in additional 
revenue over the 2010-2013 forward estimate period17 – mainly through the 
Division’s new ESS Reporting Regime the effect of which was to better identify both 
employees who received benefits and the nature and amount of those benefits). 
Despite this, Div 83A effectively replicated many for the concession provisions of the 
former Div 13A (which was repealed at the same time) – though it also introduced a 
number of new measures that were ‘designed to improve horizontal equity in the tax 
system by treating all forms of remuneration more consistently, to target employee 
share scheme tax concessions more closely to low and middle income earners, and 
to reduce the scope for losses to the Commonwealth revenue through tax evasion 
and avoidance’.18  
14 Section 139CE required that the scheme not have any conditions that could result in the shares or 
rights being forfeited, that recipients not be permitted to dispose of a share or right acquired under the 
scheme for three years after it was acquired (or ceased employment) and that the scheme operate on 
a ‘non-discriminatory basis’ (as defined in s 139GF).  
15 The exemption was originally $500 but it was increased to $1000 in 1997 to ‘broaden access to and 
increase the benefits of participation in employee share schemes’ – see Taxation Laws Amendment 
Act (No 1) 1997, Sch 3. 
16 Explanatory Memorandum to the Tax Laws Amendment (2009 Budget Measures No 2) Bill 2009 at 
paras 1.14 and 1.15. Of specific concern were instances that the ATO had identified through its 
compliance monitoring programs of executives and directors failing to pay tax associated with 
employee share schemes by (a) attempting to retrospectively elect to be taxed upfront; (b) failing to 
include the value of the discount at the cessation time; or (c) incorrectly applying the capital gains tax 
rules to the discount on the Div 13A shares or rights instead of including the discount in their 
assessable income: see ’Employee Share Scheme Arrangements’, Treasury Submission to the 
Economics References Committee, July 2009. The 10 year maximum deferral period had also caused 
concern because it provided directors and senior executives, who were usually able to ensure that the 
deferred taxing point did not occur prior to the expiry of the 10 year maximum (ie they could ensure 
that they did not exercise or dispose of the rights - or cease employment - during that time) with an 
incentive to defer their tax liability for the full 10 years. 
17 Explanatory Memorandum to the Tax Laws Amendment (2009 Budget Measures No 2) Bill 2009 at 
p.7 
18 Ibid para 1.15. These measures included changing the taxing point (and the conditions that had to 
be met to defer liability to tax), changing the conditions for exemption, and extending the operation of 
the Division to encompass past and prospective employees, subsidiaries of the employer company, 
corporate limited partnerships, corporate unit trusts and public trading trusts.  
                                                          
Consistent with the former Div 13A position, Div 83A first specifically exempted ‘ESS 
interests’ acquired under an employee share scheme from FBT.19 Also consistent 
with the former s 139B it then provided that, generally, any discount to the market 
value of ESS interests acquired under an employee share scheme would be 
included in the employee’s assessable income in that year – so its default effect was 
that the discount was taxed upfront, at the point of acquisition.20 There was however 
a $1000 tax exemption for taxpayers with an adjusted taxable income21 of $180,000 
or less – which, again, applied provided the employee and the scheme met certain 
specified conditions.22 One of these was that the employee could not, as a result of 
participating in the scheme, acquire a cumulative beneficial interest in more than 5% 
of the shares in the company or be in a position to cast, or control the casting of, 
more than 5% of the votes at a general meeting.23  
A deferral option was also provided though, unlike the situation under the former Div 
13A, whether it applied depended entirely on the structure of the scheme rather than 
on an election by the employee. For the deferred tax rules to apply the ESS interests 
either had to be acquired at a discount under an employee share scheme, had to 
relate to ordinary shares and had to be subject to a real risk of forfeiture24 or, 
alternatively, had to be acquired at a 100% discount under a salary sacrifice 
arrangement where the employee was limited to acquiring no more than $5000 worth 
of shares (it did not apply to rights) in an income year.  
A number of other conditions also had to be met for the deferral option to apply 
including that the scheme had to be ‘broadly available’ – which was defined in s 83A-
105(2) to mean that at least 75% of the employer’s permanent employees who had 
completed at least 3 years of service25 and who were Australian residents had to be 
entitled to acquire ESS interests either under that scheme or under another 
employee share scheme operated by the employer or an associate.  
For schemes that qualified for deferral of the taxing point there was also, as had 
been the case with Div 13A, a limit to the point to which the liability could be 
deferred. The restrictions were, however, substantially increased under Div 83A. 
Under ss 83A-115 and 83A-120 the ‘ESS deferred taxing point’ was the earliest of 
the times when any risk of forfeiture or restriction on disposal of the ESS interest 
19 ITAA 1997 s 83A-5 and  FBTAA s 136(1) definition of ‘fringe benefit’ paras (h) and (ha). 
20 ITAA 1997 s 83A-25 
21 The sum of the taxpayer’s taxable income (including the full amount of the discount and ignoring 
the possible exemption), reportable fringe benefits total, reportable superannuation contributions and 
total investment loss – see s 83A-35(2) 
22 ITAA 1997 s 83A-35. 
23 ITAA 1997 s 83A-35(9). 
24 Defined in s 83A-105(3) as a real risk that under the conditions of the scheme the employee would 
forfeit or lose the ESS interest (other than by disposing of it or in the case of rights to acquire shares, 
by exercising the right or allowing it to lapse).  
25 Under Div 13A the 3 year service qualification requirement had only applied to shares, not rights, 
and the effect of this extension was to restrict the application of the deferral concession for rights not 
only to directors but also to employees generally. 
                                                          
ceased to apply, when the employee ceased employment or 7 years after acquisition 
of the interest.26 The new provisions also removed two of the Div 13A deferred 
taxing points that were within the employee’s control (disposal or exercise of a right) 
so that the deferred taxing points that remained (other than cessation of 
employment) all related to occurrences outside the employee’s control.27 
Collectively, these changes severely limited an employee’s ability to defer his or her 
liability to tax. 
He only real benefit of the new rules was that, once an ESS interest received under 
an employee share scheme was taxed, any subsequent increase in value was taxed 
in the same manner as any other capital assets – so generally it was taxed under the 
CGT provisions. 
The changes that were introduced by Div 83A can be summarised as follows: 
a. it introduced an income test for the existing $1000 tax exemption – restricting 
its availability to taxpayers whose adjusted taxable income was less than 
$180,000 (designed to target the concession at promoting the availability and 
take-up of employee share schemes among low and middle income 
employees); 
b. it removed the employee’s option to defer the taxing point (a change intended 
to reduce compliance risk and improve visibility of recipients for the Tax 
Office) and replaced it with a tax deferral which was dependent on there being 
either ‘a real risk of forfeiture’ (which was defined in terms of whether a 
reasonable person would conclude that there was ‘a real risk that the share or 
right will not come home to an employee at a particular time and thus may be 
forfeited’28) or the scheme being based on a salary sacrifice arrangement with 
individual employees being limited to a maximum of $5000 worth of shares 
per year, there being no risk of forfeiture and the scheme’s governing rules 
clearly distinguishing those schemes from those eligible for the upfront 
exemption; 
c. where deferral was possible under the new rules because there was a real 
risk of forfeiture the taxing point was changed from those that had applied 
under Div 13A to the earliest of the time when there was both no longer a real 
risk that the share or right would be forfeited and no restriction on the 
employee’s right to dispose of the shares or rights (or, in the case of rights, to 
exercise them), when the employee ceased employment or 7 years after the 
employee acquired the interest.29 The amount to be included in assessable 
26 This was subject to the ’30 day rule’ under which, if the employee disposed of the ESS interest 
within 30 days of the originally determined ESS deferred taxing point, the ESS deferred taxing point 
became the time of actual disposal instead: see ITAA 1997 ss 83A-115(3) and 83A-120(3). 
27 See n 15 above. 
28 ’Employee Share Scheme Arrangements’, Treasury Submission to the Economics References 
Committee, July 2009 p 5 
29 ITAA 1997, s 83A-115 
                                                          
income at that point was the market value of the ESS interest at that point 
reduced by its cost base.30 
d. a number of integrity rules were also introduced – including a new annual 
reporting requirement for employers that offered employee share schemes 
requiring them to report the number of shares and rights an employee 
obtained both at grant and at the taxing point31 together with a limited 
withholding requirement in cases where the employee has not provided the 
employer with a TFN or ABN.32 Where the ESS interest was provided not to 
the employee but to an associate it was treated as though it had been 
acquired by the employee (to prevent leakage of revenue if the associate was 
subject to a lower marginal rate of tax); 
e. revised regulations were introduced for the valuation or shares or rights not 
listed on the stock exchange (because of concerns that the existing valuation 
rules led to under-valuation)33; and 
f. employee share schemes had to be approved by the ATO and APRA before 
qualifying for concessional tax treatment.  
Problems with the 2009 Amendments 
In many respects Div 83A was a sledge hammer used to crack a nut. While it 
reduced the opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance, it did so by reducing the 
attractiveness and, therefore, the extent to which employee share schemes were 
used34 – thereby depriving the economy of the benefits that such schemes can 
confer.35 It also did so in a way that increased both the administrative complexity 
involved in establishing and maintaining such schemes (the complexity of the 
30 ITAA 1997 s 83A-110(1) 
31 Taxation Administration Act 1953 Sch 1 Div 392 
32 Taxation Administration Act 1953 Sch 1 Subdiv 14-C 
33 See Income Tax Regulations 1997 regs 83A-315.01 to 83A-315.09 
34 In the Employee Ownership Australia and New Zealand April 2013 Report (n 37 below) it was noted 
(at p 6) that the introduction of Div 83A had had a significant impact at the broad based employee 
participation level with ‘over 90% of plans [being] suspended during the first year and 30% of plans 
[being] suspended for up to two years. Of the 30% of plans suspended for two years many have not 
been reinstated’. It also noted that ‘The $5000 salary sacrifice limit imposed under Div 83A has had 
the greatest impact on broad based employee groups, middle management and employee savings 
plans. There has been a noticeable decline in the amounts that are contributed to salary sacrifice 
employee share ownership plans as a direct result of the provisions in Div 83A and, in particular, the 
$5000 cap’ and that ‘Overall, the number of employees participating in, and the amount invested by 
employees in, employee share ownership plans has substantially reduced since the introduction of 
Division 83A’. These assertions were acknowledged in The Explanatory Memorandum to the Tax and 
Superannuation Laws Amendment (Employee Share Schemes) Bill 2015 (at p 33) but with the 
comment that ‘there is no readily available data to quantify these claims’ 
35 For a discussion of the link between ESS and improved productivity and corporate performance see 
‘Employee Share Schemes – Their Importance to the Economy’, Employee Ownership Australia and 
New Zealand Expert Panel Report, July 2014, pp 9-11. The same report also discusses the benefits 
to employees when compared to investing the same amounts in the All Ordinaries Index or using it to 
make accelerated payments on their standard home loan.   
                                                          
required valuation methodology for options being a particular problem)36 and 
compliance costs.37  
A major problem for all ESS arose because the 2009 changes moved the taxing 
point for options (at least where there was no risk that they would be forfeited) to 
when they were provided rather than when they were exercised (ie to a point before 
which the employee could generally realise any gain in order to pay the tax)38. This 
effectively killed off the provision of options under employee share schemes, 
especially for start-up companies.39 One obvious consequence of this was that start-
ups that had used such schemes in lieu of higher salaries found it increasingly 
difficult to attract the employees they needed and, in some cases, that contributed to 
them relocating overseas.40  
Even where companies retained their presence in Australia the change in the taxing 
point effectively forced them to ‘expend considerable time and financial cost in 
restructuring employee equity plans’.41  
Unlisted start-ups that did continue to offer ESS also had problems with both 
valuation and liquidity. Because they were unlisted there were difficulties in 
determining valuations effectively and, because there was not a ready market for 
their shares, it was often difficult for employees to dispose of their shares to pay the 
tax on the benefit.42  
There was also added complexity and cost for international companies that had 
previously offered their Australian employees options to acquire shares in an 
36 This was a particular problem in relation to the company valuations that were required when shares 
or options were issued (with possible multiple valuations being required each year). The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (Employee Share Schemes) Bill 
2015 (at p 32) noted that ‘Stakeholders have advised that this can cost as much as $50,000 per 
valuation in Australia, compared, for example, with the United States where the cost is US$2000 to 
US$5000’. 
37 One of the reported consequences of the changes was that nearly all companies found it necessary 
to review and revise their existing ESS arrangements with many introducing new plans and/or 
amending their existing plans. The review process involved significant cost and often resulted in 
companies having to operate more plans than they had prior to the changes. That too added to 
complexity and cost without necessarily translating into greater employee participation. See ’The 
Changing ESS Landscape since 1 July 2009’, Employee Ownership Australia and New Zealand 
(EOA) Report, April 2013 pp 11-12. 
38 For those plans that did continue this also had the effect of defeating one of the major objectives 
behind the encouragement of ESS – to give employees ‘skin in the game’. By advancing the taxing 
point employees often found that they had to dispose of their shares in order to meet their tax liability 
instead of retaining them as long-term investments.  
39 In its July 2014 Report, ‘Employee Share Schemes – Their Importance to the Economy’ the 
Employee Ownership Australia and New Zealand Expert panel noted (at p 3) that ‘Pre 2009 85% of 
start-up/growth sector companies used option plans. Post 2009 this number dropped to 6%’.  
40 Industry and Innovation Agenda - An Action Plan for a Stronger Australia, Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 14 October 2014, p 77. 
41 ’The Changing ESS Landscape since 1 July 2009’, Employee Ownership Australia and New 
Zealand (EOA) Report, April 2013 p 6. 
42 There was also a problem in that, if the start-up failed, the employees would have been required to 
pay tax on something with no realisable value. 
                                                          
overseas listed parent with the consequence that there was a decline in the number 
of international plans being offered to Australian employees. This adversely affected 
Australians employed in those companies by denying them the opportunity to 
participate in those schemes and also adversely affected the companies by 
compromising their ability to offer their Australian employees competitive 
remuneration packages.43   
The problems with the change in the taxing point for options was also exacerbated 
by the effective elimination of tax refunds for options that had vested (and therefore 
which had been subject to tax) but which were ‘out of the money’ at the exercise 
time.44  
Even for schemes that qualified for deferral of the taxing point the retention in s 83A-
115 of cessation of employment as one of those possible ‘ESS deferred taxing 
points’ created problems where the right to acquire those shares had either not then 
vested or, alternatively, was ‘out of the money’.45  This had been a concern with the 
equivalent provision in Div 13A (in that it too taxed unrealised awards) but, despite 
lobbying, it was not addressed in the 2009 changes (if anything, it was made worse 
as a result of the new Division’s limited tax refund provisions). 
Finally, the change in the disposal restriction that eligible ESS had to include in their 
rules made salary sacrifice plans less attractive to employees. Under the former Div 
13A there had been a restriction condition that operated during the then possible 
maximum 10 year tax deferral period. However, even though 85% of employees did 
not seek to access their shares during that period there was a degree of flexibility in 
the legislation and access was possible. Under Div 83A the required disposal 
restriction had to apply from the date of the offer and could only be removed in 
extreme cases such as financial hardship or special circumstances. This made 
participation in ESS less attractive and resulted, in practice, in companies limiting 
their restriction period to the minimum 3 years required. It also led to a majority of 
participants selling their shares at the end of that period in order to fund their tax 
liability.46 
The 2015 Changes 
The tax treatment to which employee share schemes were subject following the 
2009 amendments caused considerable concern and when the new coalition 
43 ’The Changing ESS Landscape since 1 July 2009’, Employee Ownership Australia and New 
Zealand (EOA) Report, April 2013 p 7. 
44 Ibid. Under ITAA97 s 83A-310 a refund of tax paid was available but only where the interest was 
forfeited otherwise than as the result of a choice by the employee (other than a choice to cease the 
employment) or of a condition of the scheme that had the direct effect of protecting (wholly or partly) 
the taxpayer against a fall in the market value of the interest.    
45 ’The Changing ESS Landscape since 1 July 2009’, Employee Ownership Australia and New 
Zealand (EOA) Report, April 2013 p 7. 
46 ‘Employee Share Schemes – Their Importance to the Economy’, Employee Ownership Australia 
and New Zealand Expert Panel Report, July 2014, p 5. 
                                                          
government was elected in September 2013 one of its first actions was to announce 
(on 18th December 2013) that it would focus on measures with the potential to 
encourage innovation and that these would include measures involving the taxation 
and regulation of employee share schemes.47 Following that announcement there 
were some minor public consultations (for two weeks commencing on 28th January in 
Sydney and Melbourne with some teleconferencing for those unable to attend those 
meetings).  
Drawing on those consultations, advice from the Prime Minister’s Advisory Council 
and a study that the Business Council of Australia produced in July 2014, the 
Government released its Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda on 14th 
October 2014 announcing, inter alia, that it would reform the tax treatment of ESS 
(defined as schemes under which, as a consequence of their employment, 
employees - or their associates48 - receive shares, stapled securities, or rights 
(including options) to acquire them (ESS interests)).  
The proposed reforms were designed ‘to bolster entrepreneurship in Australia and 
support innovative start-up companies’,49 ‘to make Australia’s taxation of ESS 
interests more competitive by international standards and to facilitate the 
commercialisation of innovative ideas in Australia … to assist innovative Australian 
firms to attract and retain high quality employees in the international labour market’50 
and to reduce ‘the compliance burden faced by small businesses and … make it 
easier and cheaper for businesses to set up and maintain an ESS’.51  
In particular the stated aims of the proposed reforms were: 
• ‘For all companies, … to ensure that they remain internationally competitive 
and reduce disincentives for employers and employees to participate in ESSs. 
• For start-ups, … to minimise complexity and compliance costs associated with 
the tax law, and increase the incentives for the start-up sector to use ESSs’.52  
In summary the effect of the 2015 changes is that: 
47 The previous Labour government had commenced the process, particularly in relation to the impact 
of the 2009 changes on start-ups (see Advancing Australia as a Digital Economy: An Update to the 
National Digital Economy Strategy, 12 June 2013) but it was carried through to implementation by the 
incoming coalition government. 
48 Both Div 13A (s 139D(1)) and Div 83A (s 83A-305) had provided that where an ESS interest was 
acquired by an associate of the employee, the employee was taxed on the value of the discount as if 
he or she had received it. This was to ensure that there could be no tax advantage in the employee 
directing that the interest be provided to an associate with a lower marginal tax rate.  
49 Explanatory Memorandum to the Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (Employee Share 
Schemes) Bill 2015 para 1.4 
50 Ibid at 1.5 
51 Ibid at 1.6 
52 Ibid at pp 33-34 
                                                          
a. the default position remains that benefits from the provision of shares or 
options under an employee share scheme are taxed upfront when the shares 
or options are provided;  
b. however employees participating in option schemes can more easily defer 
their liability to taxation until when the options are exercised and, in particular, 
without the options having to be at risk of forfeiture – though the scheme rules 
are still required to state that the tax deferred treatment applies to the scheme 
and the scheme must genuinely restrict the employee from immediately 
disposing of the rights he or she acquires;  
c. while still not permitting unlimited deferral of taxation liability, the permitted 
deferral period for ESS interests that are shares or rights has been extended 
from a maximum of 7 years from the time the shares or rights are acquired to 
a maximum of 15 years – mainly to allow start-ups more time to succeed and, 
therefore, for the value of the ESS interests to increase before they have to be 
disposed of to pay the tax liability. The ‘ESS deferred taxing point’ does 
however continue to include the earliest of when there is no real risk of 
forfeiture of the interest and any restrictions on sale are lifted and when the 
employment ceases;  
d. the exemption from taxation of the first $1000 of ESS interests provided to 
employees who earn less than $180,000 has also been retained; 
e. the integrity measures that were introduced in 2009 have largely been 
retained – though the refund provisions have been relaxed a little so that a 
choice by an employee not to exercise a right or to let a right be cancelled 
does not now prevent the refund provisions applying (provided the scheme 
has not been structured to directly protect the employee from downside 
market risk); 
f. the Commissioner is to work with industry to develop and approve (by either 
legislative instrument or regulation) safe harbour valuation methods to 
improve certainty and reduce compliance cost and, to that end, has been 
given a new power to approve market valuation methodologies. Approved 
methodologies are binding on the Commissioner but taxpayers may choose 
another methodology if it is more appropriate to their circumstances; 
g. the government also committed the ATO to work with industry and ASIC to 
develop and approve standard documentation (to be issued under the 
Commissioner’s general powers of administration) to streamline the process 
of establishing and maintaining an ESS; 
h. options and shares that eligible small start-up companies53 issue to their 
employees at a small discount may be eligible for a ‘start-up concession’ 
under which the employee does not include the discount in assessable 
income (so they are not subject to up-front taxation) provided the interests 
are, generally, held by the employee for at least three years. They are instead 
53 To be eligible the start-up must have a turnover of not more than $50 million, must be unlisted and 
must have been incorporated for less than 10 years.  
                                                          
treated as capital and tax is deferred until the share acquired on exercise of 
the right is sold with the time of acquisition for CGT discount purposes being 
the time the right was acquired not when it was exercised and the share was 
acquired.54 
i. the significant ownership and voting rights limitations that were introduced in 
2009 to prevent employees misapplying the concession in order to buy a 
business or indirectly access company profits through the ESS have been 
relaxed by doubling the existing 5% ownership and voting rights limitation to 
10%. The result is that employees can now have a greater ownership share in 
their employer without breaching the restriction (though not to such an extent 
that that the benefits of the ESS cannot be spread widely among employees 
or that the fairness or integrity of the tax system is put at risk by facilitating 
misuse of ESS arrangements). This can be especially important for small 
start-ups in the early stages of their development when they have limited 
numbers of employees and a 10% interest in the company may be worth 
comparatively little. 
 
Have the 2015 Changes Achieved their Purpose? 
The extent to which the amended rules have achieved their purpose can really only 
be determined once the new regime has been tested in the workplace. To the extent 
that they do result in an increased use of employee share schemes, both generally 
and in start-ups, they will have, at least partially, achieved their purpose. 
There are some clear positives, the major ones being the reintroduction of the option 
for employees to defer the taxing point to a more realistic time as a generally 
available entitlement.  
The retention of the ESS Reporting regime which gave the ATO better visibility of the 
operation and extent of ESS (and, arguably, was all that was really needed to 
address the problems of avoidance and evasion that were identified as the major 
issues that the 2009 reforms were designed to address55) is sensible, especially as it 
also provides scheme participants with certainty and transparency regarding the 
quantum and timing of taxable events and has helped them understand the tax 
consequences of participating in the schemes.56   
The new small start-up concession is also a significant development and can only 
assist with advancing the nation’s Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda. 
There are however still some residual problems: 
54 The small start-up concession is a standalone concession and employees who use it cannot also 
use the $1,000 up-front concession or the deferred taxation concession. 
55 ’The Changing ESS Landscape since 1 July 2009’, Employee Ownership Australia and New 
Zealand (EOA) Report, April 2013 p 5. 
56 ibid 
                                                          
a. Firstly, there is still the problem of cessation of employment remaining as an 
ESS deferred taxing point57 – even if the vesting conditions have not then 
been satisfied or if the ESS interests are then ‘out of the money’ – especially 
when that is combined with the somewhat relaxed but still restrictive refund 
rules. It could have been either deleted as a deferred taxing point (being 
replaced with some other means of ensuring collection of the tax) - or its 
application could have been qualified in some way, such as by legislatively 
making cessation of employment a trigger for the plan to stop being restricted 
an action which would both facilitate collection of the tax and improve 
fairness.58 
b. The $1,000 tax reduction limit has not been increased since 199759 so the 
real value of the concession has decreased significantly. One of the aims 
behind the 2009 amendments was to advance the time when tax was paid on 
ESS discounts. If that is still part of the aim, electing up-front taxation would 
be far more attractive if the real value of the concession was at least restored 
(or, preferably, increased) and with provision for regular increase into the 
future, through indexation or otherwise.  
c. The concession could also have been made available to all employees, as it 
was until 2009, and not simply to those with an adjusted taxable income of 
less than $180,000. 
d. If the $180,000 cap is to be retained it should at least be made subject to 
some form of automatic escalation – whether by alignment with changes to 
the top marginal tax rate threshold, by indexation to AWOTE or CPI, or 
otherwise, to preserve its true value and to prevent bracket creep excising 
otherwise qualified employees from participation in the schemes. 
e. While the introduction of the small start-up concession is a significant 
development the limitations on companies eligible to access it – while 
explicable for the reasons set out in the Explanatory Memorandum 
(essentially to ‘ensure that the concession is appropriately targeted to genuine 
Australian start-up companies)60 - do, arguably, unnecessarily constrain the 
achievement of the government’s stated aims of bolstering entrepreneurship 
in Australia and supporting innovative start-up companies.61 For example, it 
does not extend to listed companies - so start-ups that choose to list in order 
57 Cessation of employment was originally introduced as a taxing point before the introduction of Div 
83A’s reporting regime because of concerns about employees leaving the jurisdiction post-
employment but before vesting – thereby creating potential collection problems. Its application was 
not however restricted to such employees: ‘Employee Share Schemes – Their Importance to the 
Economy’, Employee Ownership Australia and New Zealand Expert Panel Report, July 2014, pp 6-7. 
58 For a discussion of the potential problems arising from cessation not being a vesting event see  
‘Employee Share Schemes – Their Importance to the Economy’, Employee Ownership Australia and 
New Zealand Expert Panel Report, July 2014, p 7. 
59 See n 15 above 
60 Explanatory Memorandum to the Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (Employee Share 
Schemes) Bill 2015 paras 1.72-1.79 
61 Ibid at para 1.4 
                                                          
to obtain capital through a public offer cannot qualify for the concession.62 Nor 
can companies that increase turnover – but not necessarily available profit – 
to more than $50 million.63 The necessity to reinvest could still constraint the 
ability of such companies to pay the salaries that concessionally taxed ESS 
were designed to replace, while the turnover limitation could restrict them from 
offering such schemes at precisely the point in their development where they 
were most needed.  
f. Similarly, the requirement that the scheme must be ‘broadly available’ to 
qualify for the start-up concession should be clarified to ensure that it does not 
preclude participation by ‘true’ start-ups (those that have only recently been 
formed). The requirement is defined in s 83A-105(2) to mean that the scheme 
must be available to at least 75% of the company’s Australian resident, 
permanent employees who have completed at least three years of service - 
but ‘true’ start-ups will have no employees of three years standing at that time. 
Interpretive Decision ID 2003/24, which applied to the equivalent provision 
under Div 13A, seems to indicate that this would not prevent the concession 
applying (because 75% of zero is zero so the requirement would always be 
satisfied) – though legislative clarification would be preferable.  
g. There is also a misalignment of the taxation treatment of shares and rights 
under the start-up concession. While it can apply to shares issued to eligible 
employees at a discount of up to 15% to market value, deferring tax on rights 
is only possible if the rights’ exercise price is greater than or equal to the 
market value of the company’s ordinary shares at the time the rights were 
acquired.64 If the intent is really to make it easier for start-ups to attract talent 
by offering participation in ESS, the rights option needs to be made 
considerably more attractive (especially given the possibility of the start-up 
failure). 
h. Similarly, in a globalised economy with an increasing use of remote 
workforces it is difficult to understand why the concession should only apply to 
Australian resident employees.65 If the aim is to permit start-ups to attract the 
best possible talent this limitation would seem to be an unnecessary 
constraint on their ability to do so. 
i. There are still considerable administrative compliance and cost burdens 
associated with ESS which could have been further reduced (though perhaps 
the ATO’s development of safe-harbour valuation methodologies and 
standard documentation for ESS will go some way to reducing those 
burdens). 
Conclusion 
62 ITAA 1997 s 83A-33(2). 
63 ITAA 1997 s 83A-33(4). 
64 ITAA 1997 s 83A-33(5). 
65 ITAA 1997 s 83A-33(6). 
                                                          
There is overwhelming evidence that the 2009 changes to the taxation of ESS 
were largely counter-productive and, instead of protecting the revenue, they 
largely killed off the schemes which governments of all political persuasions had 
sought to encourage.66 The 2015 changes have gone some considerable way to 
reinstating the attractiveness of such schemes (and extending new concessions 
when they are operated by start-ups) but there are still aspects of the taxation 
treatment which deserve further attention.  
66 Employee Share Ownership Schemes have operated in Australia since at least the 1950s (House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Education and Workplace Relations, Shared 
Endeavours – an Inquiry into Employee Share Ownership in Australia (Majority Report) (2000) 9 [2.1]) 
in line with the then Prime Minister Robert Menzies’ belief in the ‘encouragement and introduction of 
profit sharing schemes wherever possible’ (McElvaney, J and Waddel, D, The Employee Share 
Ownership Plan: what value has it for Australia? in Kennedy, J and Di Milia, L (eds), ANZAM 2006: 
Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Academy of 
Management, pp. 1-14, Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management, Lindfield, NSW. 
                                                          
